

THE WAR OF THE WORDS: AN ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION OF AMAZON.COM

YAO WANG

Department of Decision Sciences & Managerial Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
E-mail: yaowang@baf.cuhk.edu.hk

Abstract— Antitrust probe of digital industries has drawn public attention. While Apple and Google just received their rulings, Amazon is likely to be the next target of antitrust investigation. This study analyzes the major allegations against Amazon from an economics perspective. The result shows that most allegations are groundless. However, the allegation regarding free speech and search bias, which can be extended from Amazon to other dominant online platforms, warrants future research.

Index Terms— Antitrust Law, Competition Policy, Law and Economic, Pricing

I. INTRODUCTION

Amazon.com, the world's largest online retailer, is facing charges for abusing its market power in book market to hurt the interests of readers, authors, and the book industry, and even worse, to impede the free flow of ideas. In 2015, the Authors Guild, the American Booksellers Association, the Association of Authors' Representatives, Authors United, and Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman all asked Department of Justice (DOJ) to take actions against Amazon. It seems ironic that the leading reformer of literary ended up to be the archenemy of book industry. The dissatisfaction with Amazon does not happen overnight, it is foreseeable. The accusations against Amazon are the continuation of past battles, only this time the allegation list is more holistic. Back in 2009, the "Big Five" publishers (Hachette Book Group, HarperCollins Publishers, Macmillan Publishers, Penguin Group, and Simon & Schuster) were dissatisfied with Amazon's \$9.99 pricing for new titles and bestselling e-books, they colluded with Apple to raise and fix the price of e-books at \$14.99. Amazon responded by launching a disintermediation campaign for authors to directly sell their books to customers and earn up to 70% royalty. Then, Apple and "Big Five" conspired to stop supplying to Amazon unless Amazon raise the price. Eventually, DOJ investigated the case and decided in 2013 that this horizontal price-fixing conspiracy is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. In the following year, a battle between Amazon and Hachette emerged, they still disagreed with pricing of e-books, Amazon was allegedly deterring customer from ordering books published by Hachette by setting artificially long shipping time. By the end of 2014, Amazon and Hachette reached an agreement, Hachette got to decide its own prices.

Indeed, the discontent of publishers has been there for years. The call for DOJ probe of Amazon is doomed, given the fact that Amazon became a publisher in 2007. However, simply because publishers cannot compete

with Amazon does not mean that Amazon has violated the antitrust laws. The fundamental goal of antitrust laws is best described as protecting "consumers from anticompetitive conduct—conduct that creates market power, transfers wealth from consumers to producers, and fails to provide consumers with compensating benefits." (Kirkwood, 2014). The plaintiffs know too well about this goal, and thus they argue that they concern more about free speech than about themselves, strategically leveraging recent concerns about the impact of digital industry on competition and democracy.

In light of the recent attention on antitrust investigation of digital industries, this study aims to closely scrutinize the major allegations against Amazon from an economics perspective and shed some light on the emerging topic of antitrust on internet. This papers proceeds as follows: in section 2, I briefly introduce Amazon's business, define the market and then analyze related industry. In section 3, I analyze the allegations from an economics perspective, and use data to tackle the tricky allegation of Amazon's manipulation of readers. In section 4, I provide policy suggestions and draw the conclusion.

II. AMAZON AND BOOK INDUSTRY

A. Amazon's Business

Founded in 1994 by Jeff Bezos, Amazon started as an online merchant of books, and later became the largest online retailer that offers a wide variety of products and services, such as music, videos, toys, apparel, electronics, and cloud service. As Bezos hoped, Amazon indeed became the everything store, and much more. Besides the role as an online retailer, Amazon is also an e-commerce marketplace for other sellers.

In 2007, Amazon expanded the e-book market by introducing its e-reader Kindle, which enables readers to easily carry a digital library with them to read in anywhere at any time. Amazon keeps updating the hardware, there are 8 generations of Kindle already (Kindle Oasis was just released on April 27, 2016).

Amazon enjoyed the first-mover advantage, although Amazon never release the specific sales data of Kindle, Kindle is the undisputed number one e-reader. Moreover, Kindle introduces a revolution in book industry, resulting in an explosion of e-book titles.

Along with the introduction of Kindle 1 in November, 2007, Amazon launched Kindle Direct Publishing that provides self-publishing service for authors. Later in 2014, Amazon launched Kindle Scout, a reader-powered publishing platform on which readers can nominate books they like to be published by Kindle Press, and the reader who nominates the books that get published can enjoy an early free copy of those books. Amazon is doing well as a publisher, authors report to 2013 eBooks Self-Publisher Survey that 85% of their e-book sales were represented by Amazon (Wogahn, 2013).

The Authors United (2015) maintains that Amazon controls more than 75% of online sales of physical books. Author Earnings (2015) reports that Amazon accounts for 74% of US e-book sales, and 65% of traditionally-published e-book sales. The data do not suffice to show that Amazon is a monopoly, but do indicate that Amazon is the biggest player in online book retailing. However, the market share is obtained through technological advances, business model innovation and free competition. Therefore, the large market share is not a per se violation of the antitrust laws, since such preeminence may be a result of its superior performance in serving customers, the key is whether Amazon's conducts lessen the competition and hurt consumers

B. Market Definition

The first step of any antitrust investigation is to define the market. Throughout the letters sent to DOJ, there is a clear focus on book market, rather than the narrower e-book market. The allegations argue that Amazon is abusing its "unprecedented market power" in book market (not limited to e-book market). Therefore, follow the argument made by the plaintiffs, this study define the focal market as the sale in the United States of trade books in either electronic formats or print formats.

Amazon, as a publisher, is competing in the publishing industry. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Census reports a total of 3,000 publishers in the nation, however, publishing industry is actually dominated by several players. According to the Authors United (2015), Amazon is the largest publisher in the world since Amazon "uploads about 500,000 new titles every year" through its publishing platform, compared to 15,000 new titles of Penguin Random House, which is the largest traditional publisher in the world. However, this argument is flawed, market share data is essential to substantiate this claim. In fact, "Big Five" publishers (previously "Big Six" until the merger of Penguin and Random House in 2013), including Penguin Random

House, Macmillan, HarperCollins, Hachette and Simon & Schuster, accounts for 37% of the market share. Self-publishing accounts for 18% of the market share. The rest 45% of the market share is shared by indie publishers, small or medium publishers and uncategorized single-author publishers.

One important feature of publishing industry is that a publisher normally has multiple imprints, the brand names publishers use to sell books to customers from different demographic segments. Amazon has 14 imprints, such as CreateSpace, Thomas & Mercer, AmazonCrossing, and Lake Union Publishing, that mainly specialized in publishing thrillers, mysteries, horror stories, romances. While "Big Five" together have more than 250 imprints, and generally, there are at least 60 titles in Amazon's list of the top 100 bestselling books of the year are from "Big Five".

As a book retailer, Amazon is competing with other online/offline retailers. In terms of physical book sales, there are tons of retailers all over the nation, including chains like Barnes & Noble, independents like Book Ends, merchants like Wal-Mart, terminals like train station, supermarkets like Stop and Shop, convenience stores like 7-11, and college bookstores like Follett, online bookstores like BetterWorldBooks and etcetera. Whereas in terms of e-book sales, the major retailers are Barnes & Noble, Apple, Kobo, and Google. Basically, Amazon is not a monopoly in either physical book market or e-book market.

III. THE ALLEGATION

The plaintiff raised a long list of allegations against Amazon. This study categorizes these allegations and link them to relevant economics concepts.

C. Vertical Control

Allegations fall into this category generally accuse Amazon has been using its "monopsony power" to bully publishers and authors. For example, they argue that Amazon delisted books from Hachette. However, "businesses are generally free to choose the parties with whom they will deal, as well as the prices, terms, and conditions of that dealing." (Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Comm'n, Inc., 552 U.S. 438, 439, 2009).

Amazon also allegedly charges fees for services, such as warehouse and shipping, publishers will be cut out if they do not pay the fees. The related economics concept is slotting fee, the fee manufacturers pay to get their products placed on the retailers' shelves. It is a common practice among offline retailers, including physical bookstores. Although Amazon is an online retailer, the same logic applies.

Klein and Wright (2007) maintain that retailers do not have sufficient incentive to offer a particular manufacturer the right quantity of shelf space to maximize the manufacturer's profit, since the product displayed on the promotional shelf does not induce the customers of other retailers to purchase from them.

However, the products placed on the promotional shelf may help the manufacturers to attract customers who would not otherwise buy the product. Thus, manufacturers have to provide the incentive to retailers. Klein and Wright (2007) also argue that slotting contracts generally concern a short period of time, do not have any exclusivity clause, and such practice raise the cost for every manufacture to obtain distribution. In an empirical study, Wright (2007) finds no evidence indicates that slotting contract is anticompetitive, and slotting actually increases consumer welfare. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook explicitly endorses the competition for shelf space, and points out that slotting contract is actually a kind of competition that antitrust laws protect. Therefore, Amazon's practice of charging fees for its services is not a violation of antitrust laws.

D. Monopolization

The allegations fall into this category are mainly about the Kindle e-book system. The plaintiffs argue that Amazon is excluding competitors by forcing publishers to publish in AZW, a format owned by Amazon, rather than other open-source formats, such as EPUB and PDF. However, they also mentioned that AZW is the most user friendly format, and it has been around long before EPUB. Thus, it seems that there is no reason for Amazon to not to use AZW, given that this format offers utility to readers.

As a matter of fact, even if readers prefer EPUB or any other formats, they can easily convert AZW to EPUB, PDF, TXT, or any other formats, and vice versa. For example, Calibre, a free software, enables readers to perform such conversion. Books bought from other sources can also be read on Kindle devices. However, readers are prevented to do so because publishers impose digital rights management (DRM) on e-books, making the conversion of formats illegal, since readers have to first illegally remove the DRM, and then convert the format. If there is indeed any anticompetitive element, publishers are more likely the ones who unfairly restrict trade.

Admittedly, DRM helps to protect intellectual rights and in turn the revenue of publisher, but it can also lock consumers in some particular e-book ecosystem, reduce the interoperability of e-books (Daly, 2013). However, Amazon's free Kindle app can be operated on almost all platforms, including those non-Amazon platforms, such as iOS, Windows, Linux, and Android. The concern about potential exclusion is alleviated

E. Predatory Pricing

Amazon allegedly sells many types of e-books below cost, given the fact that Amazon charges \$9.99 for some e-books when the wholesale price is about \$12. The focus here is in line with the Apple and Big Five e-book conspiracy, the right price for e-books. Amazon believes that e-books can and should be

cheaper than paperbacks, since e-books do not have issues of printing, forecast, returns, out of stock, warehousing costs, transportation costs and secondary market. In contrast, Big Five believes that e-books should be the same as paperbacks, and thus they are fighting for higher prices for readers by collectively setting a high price for Amazon (similar to resale price maintenance), and thus it is not surprising that DOJ ruled their conduct as a per se violation of Sherman Act.

Simply because Amazon is selling some titles below cost does not necessarily mean that Amazon is engaged in predatory pricing. The intention to eliminate competition and create a monopoly must be substantiated. In fact, Amazon does not sell all the e-books below cost, rather, it sells many e-books above cost. According to the investigation during the Apple e-book conspiracy case by DOJ, Amazon does not have losses when comparing the total revenue and the total costs of e-books. Another evidence is that many players entered the e-book market when Amazon charged \$9.99, and thus there is no way to articulate that Amazon is creating a monopoly. Therefore, such selective below cost pricing serves more like a loss leader to stimulate sales of other products. Judge Cote maintains that Amazon is using a loss leading strategy, which normally does not hurt consumers, rather than predatory pricing. DOJ and FTC (Federal Trade Commission) could have taken actions against Amazon during the investigation of Apple and Big Five's conspiracy, in which case Amazon was also probed.

In essence, the marginal cost of e-books is nearly zero and the price elasticity of e-books is high. The "right" price is the one that maximize profit. Although e-books are cheaper than paperbacks, lower prices will induce more sales and in turn more revenue. Amazon (2014) finds that "For every copy an e-book would sell at \$14.99, it would sell 1.74 copies if priced at \$9.99", and lower price is good for all parties since the pie is bigger. Nevertheless, Big Five believe that cheaper e-books cannibalize their sales of print books, reducing their profit.

The more serious concern is that e-books will eventually destroy traditional publishing where Big Five have the market power, and remove traditional publishers as intermediaries. Thus, to Big Five, the right price is the one that protects their sales of print books. However, this perspective is myopic, books are not something that people cannot live without. Traditional publishers do not realize that books not only compete with books, but also compete with other forms of entertainment, such as mobile games, television, movies, blogs and much more. Readers may switch to other entertainment if they think the price is too high. Further analysis is needed to tell what the right price for e-books is.

F. Manipulation of Readers

After analyzing the aforementioned accusations, it seems unreasonable for the plaintiff to raise so many groundless allegations. This part shows that they are not insane. The allegations fall into this category are not really about antitrust, but about political correctness, at least they argue in such way. They claim that book market is an informational marketplace, and the large market share in this market is per se illegal. According to Wikipedia, “the marketplace of ideas holds that the truth will emerge from the competition of ideas in free, transparent public discourse”, and thus it is important to democracy. The classification (NAICS) of the Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, indeed suggests that book publishing is in the information sector.

However, the two allegations, price discrimination and search bias, are about book retailing rather than book publishing, and thus extra caution is needed. Nevertheless, many believe that books are more than a normal commodity, such as coffee or orange juice, rather, they have cultural, intellectual, and political implications (Greco, 2013). The plaintiffs claim that Amazon is impeding the free flow of ideas. The publishers require Amazon to foster a set of values, which they impose on book industry, they themselves do a much lousier job than Amazon by sticking to the traditional gate-keeping model and dictating what get to be published and read. Such accusation, although largely overstated, is still tricky to analyze. The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” However, Amazon is not the government, and it is not certain under what conditions books constitute speech. Hence, my analysis focuses on the existence of the alleged conducts.

Price discrimination

Amazon is accused of charging different customers different prices for the same books based on their personal data. This is price discrimination in economics term. Normally it is hard to price discriminate since it requires market power, information and no resale. It is possible for Amazon to do so because Amazon has enormous datasets and sophisticated algorithm that can facilitate the process. Price discrimination is not per se illegal. Robinson-Patman Act specifically states that the price discrimination is illegal if it “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce”. Generally, the lawsuit of price discrimination all happened in business-to-business sector, rather than in business-to-consumer sector. Moreover, the only evidence provided is that, in 2000, a customer found Amazon offer a lower price for the same DVD if he clear all the cookies, i.e. Amazon charged regular customer higher prices. 15 years have passed and there is no evidence from the book

retailing. Thus, this allegation is at best a hearsay.

However, price discrimination is framed as a tool of Amazon to manipulate readers. The plaintiffs maintain that Amazon offers discounts and promotions to readers based on their personal data to induce them to buy certain books, preventing consumers from seeing the books they like and violating their right to get a full spectrum of information, regardless of the fact that traditional publishers refuse to publish tons of books and physical bookstores have much less titles available than Amazon.

Admittedly, Amazon’s alleged price discrimination may reduce the sales of certain less promoted books. However, as the plaintiffs argue, Amazon uses consumers’ personal information to recommend books they would probably like, meaning that even if Amazon offers discount for the books consumers are not interested in, they will not purchase anyway. In essence, consumers’ tastes count.

If this has anything to do with the free flow of ideas, it is the “filter bubble” or “echo chamber”, where different opinions are underrepresented or even disallowed, meaning that people interact with like-minded people and consume the content that holds similar opinions with them. This is a pervasive phenomenon online, although unprecedented information is readily available in this era, people are actually less likely to be exposed to different opinions. Using data from 10.1 million Facebook users, Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic (2015) find that people only consume 7 percent attitude-challenging information available in their Feeds. The authors attribute this phenomenon to the frequent interaction with like-minded people, the algorithm selection of content to present based on individuals’ previous behaviors and individuals’ reluctance to click on the ideological-challenging information available. Notably, the results shows that among all these factors that limit exposure to diverse opinions, individuals’ choice had the strongest effect. After all, it is people who decide whether or not to read, they create their own “filter bubble”. Thus, it involves psychological analysis of information avoidance behavior, which refers to people avoid information that is free and beneficial for decision making (Sweeny et al., 2010). The research on “filter bubble” is a new filed, studies with mixed findings are continuously emerging. For example, another study analyzes web browsing histories for 50,000 U.S.-located users and finds that online channels are associated with an increase in exposure to different opinions (Flaxman, Goel, and Rao, 2015). Therefore, it is way too early to use such mixed findings to dictate Amazon as a villain.

Search bias

Similar to Google, Amazon is accused of steering consumers toward its own products. Own content bias in physical stores is a topic draws economists’

attention. In reality, physical bookstores, supermarkets, and other outlets “all exercise discretion over how products are allocated on shelves, promoted, and featured” (Manne and Wright, 2012). The main idea is that vertically integrated firms may favor their own products, whether it is anticompetitive or not depends on the situation. Empirical studies suggest that it is almost always pro-competitive (Edelman, Benjamin, and Wright, 2012). Same logic applies to online context. The focus of antitrust laws should be whether the bias creates substantial exclusion of competitors and anticompetitive effect on consumers. The analysis can follow the same logic used in Google’s case. Google was accused of search bias, i.e. the search engine favors its own content and discriminates rivals’ content. Google’s rivals assume that there exist a neutral ranking, in which the search results are ranked purely based on automated relevance without any adjustment. However, they overlook the possibility that Google’s customer may prefer Google’s products. Manne and Wright (2012) cite several consumer reports to argue that consumers actually prefer search to remove those irrelevant links and save their searching costs. Wright (2011) maintains that bias is an essential part for any system of any size to serve consumers with heterogeneous preferences, additionally, search ranking does not represent consumption at all, not to mention the search ranking is notoriously short-lived, and thus its effect is marginal. Moreover, Ratliff and Rubinfeld (2014) argue that Google does not have duty to aid a competitor by giving free publicity to it. Indeed, FTC found insufficient evidence and did not launch any formal complaint about Google’s search bias after investigation.

The first step to examine the anticompetitive effect of search bias is to establish the existence of such bias. In the empirical test of 1,000 random searches on Google and other search engines, Wright (2011) finds that when considering the entire first page of search results, Google does not return its own content in over 90% tests, and thus the existence of the search bias is questionable, and rivals may be in the same position even without the “biased” Google.


Following Wright (2011), this study also run some searches to find evidence for Amazon’s alleged search bias. I searched 40 Goodreads Genres (e.g. art, business, crime, memoir and etcetera) in the Department of Books and Department of Kindle E-books on Amazon respectively. The result from Department of Books (Figure 1) shows that Amazon places its own content at first place in 7 queries out of the 40 queries; consider the entire first page (12 books in each query), Amazon in average returns its own content for 2.5 times in each query (12 results in one query); Amazon does not return its own content at all in 10 queries. The result from Department of Kindle E-books is similar, Amazon places its own content at

first place in 10 queries out of the 40 queries; consider the entire first page (16 books in each query), Amazon in average returns its own content for 4 times in a query (16 results in one query); Amazon does not return its own content at all in 4 queries out of the 40 queries. Thus, even with the non-random search, there is no strong evidence suggests that Amazon is biased toward its own content.



Moreover, Amazon offers various book lists for consumers. I also check these lists and collect some data. For the list of Kindle top 100 bestsellers (update hourly), approximately 35 titles are from Amazon and 29 are from Big Five (compared to 81 titles from Big Five on Barnes & Noble and 65 on iTunes). For the list of Kindle top 100 bestsellers of 2016, 14 titles are from Amazon. For the list of top 100 Amazon editors’ picks of 2015, only 1 title is from Amazon, and 84 titles are from Big Five, providing counterevidence for the Amazon’s own content bias since this list should have been the most biased. The fact that around 35% hourly bestselling books are from Amazon does not prove that Amazon is biased, it is possible that Amazon’s users simply prefer its own content, considering the fact that its own content are normally incorporated in Kindle Unlimited Reading program (\$9.99/month to read various books).

This study also collected the top 100 bestselling books data from 2007 to 2016. The result is shown in Figure 2. Clearly, although Big Five accounts for less titles in the bestselling list, Amazon does not steal their sales away, since it, at most, occupies 2 positions in the yearly list. The independent publishers, small and medium publishers, and those single-author publishers have more positions.



CONCLUSION

Amazon has obtained huge success in e-commerce, especially in book arena, through technological

innovation and business model innovation. By challenging the status quo, Amazon's self-publishing competes well with the traditional gate-keeping model, driving a disruptive innovation in the industry. As the pioneer, Amazon seeks to further revolutionize the book industry by eliminating the intermediaries, i.e. traditional publishers. The dispute between Amazon and traditional publishers and bookstores are inevitable.

Is Amazon really the archenemy of book industry as stated by the plaintiff? Although the Author United claims it represents all the authors, more than 8,000 writers signed petition titled "Stop Fighting Low Prices and Fair Wages" to condemn Big Five. They argue that Big Five dictate what readers are allowed to read and which authors get to publish, charge high price, pay authors as little as possible, resist technology, and protect the status quo. Thus, there is no consensus that Amazon is the villain.

Throughout the analysis, all the allegation are found groundless. It seems that Amazon's rivals wrapped the intention to preserve their privilege in a serving public interest way. Indeed, representatives of the Authors Guild and Authors United says "we feel that the public advent of the Internet was a huge mistake" and "we feel innovation should be a crime", admitting that they hate innovation in book industry and wants to return to the status when books are overwhelmingly expensive. They ignored the fact that consumers choose to buy books from Amazon because it serves their preferences better than the brick-and-mortar bookstores. As Judge Cote states in *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), "the antitrust laws were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors." Current evidence does not justify any antitrust actions against Amazon. Therefore, it is reasonable that DOJ has not initiated any investigation of Amazon.

Nevertheless, antitrust on the internet is difficult (Manne and Rinehart, 2013). Online competition is featured by dynamics and innovation, and the economics of online business are poorly understood. Moreover, Antitrust has focused on economics, it may be not an appropriate tool to analyze the allegations such as "impede the free flow of idea", and the effects of booming digital industries on culture and politics are yet to be explored. Currently, deep insight is still lacking, the enforcement of antitrust allegations that lack of concrete evidence of anticompetitive effects would "chill innovation and competition that currently provides immense benefits to consumers" (Manne and Wright, 2011). Therefore, government should bear in mind the limits of current antitrust laws and economics theory, and be extraordinarily cautious to take actions in this arena.

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